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Executive Summary
This background paper outlines issues that emerged from research commissioned by the Australian 
Civil-Military Centre (ACMC) in early 2013 to map international perspectives and trends in security 
sector reform (SSR). 
The concept of SSR has evolved over the last two decades to describe a range of efforts to improve 
the security of a state and its citizens through an effective, affordable, accountable and transparent 
security sector. In all cases, but particularly for conflict-affected states, SSR is about governance of 
the security sector. Many Australian government departments and agencies, civil society and other 
organisations have contributed to SSR throughout the post-Cold War period. 
One trend observed in war-to-peace transitions after the Cold War is that the more expansive peace 
processes that follow complex civil wars still centre on first gaining agreement about future security 
arrangements. Some of the most common provisions in peace agreements include restructuring 
the security apparatus, demobilisation, and re-establishing civilian oversight over state security 
institutions. These ambitious goals mean timing, sequencing and political legitimacy are critical to 
achieve meaningful reform within and between those institutions. Transitional political arrangements 
after conflict—in place until the first post-conflict elections—were shorter (under two years) in 
many cases in the 1990s, and in recent coup cases. However, transitional arrangements have been 
in place much longer in several recent civil war cases (four to seven years). This has resulted in 
significant post-conflict strengthening and restructuring of armies and police forces before elected 
legitimate leaders and parliaments are in place, often embedding the composition of security 
institutions that were legacies of the conflict. Research points to a more sustainable peace if former 
enemies are incorporated into, and share power in, state security institutions. 
SSR has emerged as one element of a broader set of priorities for countries navigating their return 
from violent conflict. The research mapped improvements to international responses before and 
since the landmark Brahimi Report in 2000. 
This paper examines the articulation of the SSR concept in the development, peace and security 
communities. At the time of writing, there were five peacekeeping and five political missions with 
explicit SSR mandates from the UN Security Council, with the growth of political missions (Libya, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Burundi and Nepal) a recent phenomenon. The paper discusses what SSR has 
come to encompass, including principles that underpin international support. Sovereignty is a 
fundamental principle for national actors receiving support in this area, and evaluations stress 
the need to be adaptable and to tailor each program. The politics of funding SSR is also examined, 
and found to manifestly affect how international actors support SSR. The paper concludes with a 
summary of the SSR community and its civilian capacity.
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Introduction
Purpose 
Security sector reform (SSR) in conflict-affected states is a key area of focus for the Australian Civil-
Military Centre (ACMC).1 The ACMC commissioned research from January to April 2013 to map 
international perspectives and trends in SSR. The goal was to inform future work in the field by 
providing an understanding of the trends and mapping who is doing what and where.
This background paper presents trends across SSR in conflict-affected countries, approaches to 
supporting SSR, SSR terminology and the politics of funding SSR activities. The paper concludes with 
an overview of the growth of the SSR community of practice that has emerged in the last decade.2
The SSR concept has evolved over the last two decades. It describes a range of efforts to improve 
the security of a state and its citizens, through an effective, affordable, accountable and transparent 
security sector. SSR is fundamentally about governance of the security sector. It commonly involves 
programs aimed at: 
 > reconstituting and right-sizing the military, police and other uniformed (armed) institutions, and 
demarcating roles between them
 > integrating or returning former combatants to civilian life
 > strengthening or establishing effective civilian oversight and decision making over state security 
institutions, and coordination mechanisms to sustain it
 > rebuilding trust between state security institutions and citizens. 
When led by national actors, and with coordinated international support, these activities can help 
sustain peace and reduce conflict relapse. 
Research and methodology
The research was guided by the project terms of reference,3 and involved key informant interviews 
with Australian and international experts. The two other components of the research, completed 
in parallel, were a review of Australian government experiences in security, law and justice, and a 
review of future options for government policy and practice in SSR. The researchers collected several 
hundred public documents on international SSR debates, lessons learned, and Australian approaches 
to security, law and justice (see Annex H: Bibliography).
Between 5 and 8 February 2013, researchers interviewed 42 people in 18 meetings and roundtable 
discussions held in Canberra. A preliminary report was provided to the ACMC on 15 March, and its 
findings and options were presented, critiqued and improved in a workshop of 18 government experts 
on 20 March. From 18 to 21 March, more interviews were conducted through 49 phone calls, email 
communications, meetings and roundtable discussions. This brought the total number of interviewees 
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to 80. While each interview was tailored (and non-attributed), interviewees were generally asked 
three questions: what did they understand by SSR as a concept, including international trends; 
what were their experiences and lessons on security, law and justice policy and practice in conflict-
affected states; and, what did they see as feasible options for the ACMC and government to consider 
developing in the future?
Detective Sergeant Steve Mellick, AFP Secondee at the ACMC, coordinated the project. Dr Peter Bartu 
contributed to the research including interviewing several principals from the Center for Civil-Military 
Relations at the United States Naval Post-Graduate School in Monterey, California. 
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Trends in peace and security: security actors emerging 
from conflict 
Military-security restructuring is hugely critical to a successful transition, but it is also hugely 
difficult, because it directly threatens an array of vested interests.4
Transition, concepts of security, and peace processes 
The broader narrative on the emergence of the concept of SSR includes three separate regional 
transitions:5 
 > efforts to minimise the negative effects of continued military involvement in politics during Latin 
American wars and democratic transitions in the 1980 and 1990s 
 > new state and security sector formation in central and eastern Europe after the Cold War and the 
break-up of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 
 > armies returning to barracks, and armed groups integrating into state military and police forces and 
reintegrating into communities in African civil wars.
The rise of more varied concepts of security have also affected SSR, in particular a focus on soft 
‘human security’ and attempts to re-balance the historical focus on hard ‘traditional security’.6 The 
soft approach stalled to a degree after 11 September 2001, when counter-terrorism efforts returned to 
‘state-centric’ security support, including a focus on increasing operational capacity of security and 
intelligence institutions to address transnational asymmetric threats.7 
Although each post-conflict state has taken its own path, some trends are evident. One is that 
complex civil wars have generated complex peace processes, and Comprehensive Peace Agreements 
(CPAs) have expanded in scope and ambition. Researchers studied 27 peace agreements since 
1989 for a 2006–07 World Bank and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Statebuilding 
project. The researchers grouped and analysed 38 different provisions in these agreements to plot the 
expanding scope (the number of provisions in peace agreements) and specificity (where actions of the 
parties to the conflict were subject to benchmarking).8 As illustrated in Annex A, the research found 
that these more complex agreements still centred on mediating future security political arrangements 
between parties emerging from the conflict. Election provisions appeared most often, in 25 
agreements. Security reform was the second most common provision, in 24 agreements. Of those, 
all 24 included restructuring the security apparatus, 23 included disarmament and demobilisation, 17 
included re-integration of ex-combatants, and 11 included provisions for civilian oversight of security. 
Not only did nearly all of the 27 agreements researched have at least one of the security provisions, 
there was also a high degree of specificity where the security sector provisions were subject to 
benchmarking (see Figure 1 below).9 
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Other recent research concluded, however, that these SSR provisions in peace agreements are 
often shallow and selective, that there is little consistency, and that specificity doesn’t necessarily 
help implementation. Even in cases with well-articulated reforms spelt out in agreements, some 
still experienced dysfunctional and predatory security institutions impervious to change and civilian 
governance.10
Figure 1: Scope and specificity of security provisions in peace agreements
The space for reform: transitional political arrangements and 
legitimacy 
In Collier’s assessment, to break a conflict trap and promote rule by consent, ‘the military should be 
reduced in size [and] there is likely to be a need for an expanded police force to deal with a crime wave 
as the violent diversify from war to crime’.11 
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When addressing such ambitious goals while negotiating political transitions, the timing and 
sequencing of different activities become very important. Collectively, all activities have to generate 
a minimum threshold of political legitimacy to ensure a successful transition, and elections have 
become one of the principal vehicles to secure that legitimacy. First and subsequent post-conflict 
elections have also become bellwethers that benchmark consolidation of the peace process and 
the adjustment, drawdown and withdrawal of peacekeepers. 
Transitional political arrangements are measures for governing spelt out in agreements signed by 
parties to a conflict. Examples of these arrangements are institutional power sharing and transitional 
government (see Annex A).12 The arrangements generally last until a full electoral cycle is completed to 
restore or establish an elected executive and legislature. The length of the transitional period shapes 
short-term and long-term calculations of national political and security actors. These transitional 
periods also ‘tend to provide the most salient departure point for choices about permanent 
institutions’,13 potentially setting the conditions for police, defence and other security forces, 
and civilian overseeing bodies.
In the 1990s, pressure to terminate civil wars led to early first elections, ending transitional 
arrangements that had been set up in peace processes.14 Short transition periods provided little space 
to consider ambitious reform of the governance of the security actors emerging from conflict. In some 
cases this embedded the existing composition of security institutions that might have contributed to 
the conflict. For example, it may have embedded compositions based on ethnicity, political affiliation, 
regional or provincial bias, along socio-economic divides, or where there were convenient business 
(rent-seeking) partnerships, in particular in controlled territory during conflict.
A similar trend observed in recent cases of coups, or departures from constitutional order, involves 
the threat or the use of force to seize executive power. Many coups have occurred in conflict-affected 
countries, and three recent coups—in Kyrgyzstan, Mauritania and Guinea—led to elections in less 
than two years. Notably, other research identified that while there are fewer coups worldwide than 
the peak in the mid-1960s, since 2003 there has been a spike of ‘successful coups’ (12 of 18 coups). 
The research found that ‘professional militaries are often the culprits’, but perpetrators have also 
involved the police, and civilian perpetrators required police support to successfully change a regime. 
The aftermath of military-led coups likely created ‘factions and splits within the leadership’, but also 
resulted in elections (not creating military regimes). The research finds a positive outcome can be 
attributed to ‘international influences’ to a significant degree.15
On the other hand, in the last decade transitional political arrangements have lasted significantly 
longer in several prominent civil war cases, changing the dynamics for reforming security institutions. 
In five cases these interim arrangements governed the state from between four to seven years, with 
crises, missed deadlines and extensions beyond original agreement dates.16 In these cases, national 
military and police institutions were being reconstituted and rebuilt (not necessarily reformed) in the 
period before an election could establish political leadership with more legitimacy. Call’s analysis 
looked at experiences of power-sharing compared to power-dividing arrangements. Call found many 
factors influencing success, noting ‘tremendous disparity among scholars’. The analysis concluded 
that incorporating former enemies into security institutions has produced very positive outcomes.17 
7Security Sector Reform Trends: Conflict-Affected States and International Responses   ACMC
Through these longer transitional periods, civilian leadership of the security sector was often split 
between former combatants in power-sharing arrangements, while authority transitioned from the 
army to the police. As one Australian government interviewee put it, the question is ‘when do the blue 
take over?’
Even when SSR provisions were included in peace agreements, reform implementation mechanisms 
with international support were often weak or not present. International peacekeepers were often 
‘displacing’ state security institutions, yet these national institutions were still needed to provide 
basic security, for example, to create an environment conducive to returning refugees and internally 
displaced people and, in some cases, to conduct offensive operations against non-state actors (such 
as against spoilers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Afghanistan). Given the more 
limited political legitimacy and inclusiveness of transitional governments, this provided challenges 
for national and international actors seeking to improve governance of the security sector.18 It is 
particularly challenging, for example, for national leaders to negotiate reduced or changed military 
powers when the military is conducting operations to prosecute new or old threats to the state.
Additional trends and lessons from SSR
The following additional lessons emerged from recent efforts to enhance security sector reform in 
conflict-affected states:
 > When designing SSR processes, stay focused on governance, the ‘high politics’ and ‘sector-wide’ 
levels, and avoid the temptation to descend below the strategic to the ‘component’ and ‘activity’ 
levels.19
 > In mediating and implementing SSR, include women and youth as active participants in change, 
consider a sufficiently inclusive process of consultation that builds trust and a common vision of the 
role and capacity of all security actors in society, and consider credible third parties, civil society 
and informed media representatives to monitor and benchmark implementation.20 
 > While implementing SSR, be wary of conflict relapse (the conflict trap21), continued militarisation of 
the political environment and coup d’état, be alert to spoilers, and secure ‘a monopoly of force [by 
the] two interlocking processes’ of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and SSR.22
 > Spikes in civil disorder, other forms of violence, transnational threats, more organised and capable 
criminal groups, and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons further complicate reform 
and change. This creates significant security and disarmament challenges in the years after armed 
conflict ceases.23
 > Victims may demand vetting of human rights abusers from reconstituted military and police 
forces.24 This may affect reform implementation and, while reform is ongoing, transitional justice 
processes (truth seeking or prosecutions) could expose past crimes, implicating serving senior 
officers in defence and police forces.25
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 > National political leaders must focus on both the character and composition of state security 
institutions as well as the institutions that support them, for example, ministries, audit and 
ombudsman offices, parliamentary committees, and the national security coordination and policy-
making architecture. ‘In short, countries and sub-national areas with the weakest institutional 
legitimacy and governance are the most vulnerable to violence and instability and the least able 
to respond to internal and external stresses.’26
 > Integrate systems and capacity around public administration into SSR—paying police salaries, 
increasing transparency in the preparation and expenditure of military budgets, and ensuring 
ministerial and parliamentary oversight to combat corruption—including international efforts 
in support of improved public financial management. As a World Bank review in Afghanistan 
declared, ‘there is no justification for treating the security sector as separate or sacrosanct, 
and not subjecting it to budgetary and fiduciary processes’.27 
Although this paper is limited to conflict-affected states where a UN or other international mission 
is deployed, it is worth noting the very broad support for regional and international organisations to 
invest more fully in mediation and in conflict prevention, across the environmental spectrum. That 
includes in countries where no international mission is deployed (non-mission settings).28 Not only is 
the SSR concept a topic of negotiation between peace process parties in non-mission settings, but 
many of these countries are also discussed in the UN Security Council. For example, to support the 
transition and ‘avert civil war’ the Security Council met four times on Yemen in 2012, discussed the 
transition in monthly Middle East and other high-level meetings, and the International Crisis Group’s 
most recent report on Yemen is dedicated to SSR.29
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Integrate effort, partner and be flexible: SSR as one area 
of peacebuilding
While SSR is a central pillar of any sustainable political settlement, it is seen as but one element of 
a broader set of priorities in countries navigating their return from violent conflict. The SSR concept 
stresses the importance of governance, and includes non-state security actors. Reconciliation 
between former combatants has therefore been a key aspect of SSR negotiations. SSR approaches 
also advertise the benefits of a stronger civil society role in providing public scrutiny, and in monitoring 
human rights violations by security actors. SSR was influenced by the evolving concepts of the rule of 
law and transitional justice, and came in the wake of failures in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. 
In the words of the landmark Brahimi Report in 2000, ‘Over the last decade the United Nations has 
repeatedly failed to meet the challenge [of saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war], 
and it can do no better today’.30 A significant portion of that report dealt with failures in politics, 
prevention and mediation in dealing with spoilers and other armed groups, and in developing national 
security capacity that is accountable to citizens, to replace peacekeepers. The report advocated 
a change in how the international community worked together (for example, to better integrate its 
efforts) and called for stronger international police mandates and capacities to support reforming, 
training and restructuring national police forces. 
The Security Council, other international and regional organisations, and member states subsequently 
increased their threshold for intervention (for example, transitional administrations in Kosovo and 
Timor-Leste). They also began to support a broader spectrum of peacebuilding activities, such as 
constitutional design and public administration reform (see Annexes A and B). As a concept, SSR was 
one of the last areas of peacebuilding to emerge, and is strongly influenced by these other processes. 
In addition, key peace and security lessons identified and developed since the Brahimi Report have 
strongly influenced all potential SSR support activities that the international community provides. 
Examples include the need to integrate the efforts of, and partnerships between, national and 
international actors, to build trust over time, and to have a flexible mindset, structures and funding 
to respond to unforseen events.31 
Five years after the Brahimi Report, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2005 initiative ‘Peace 
Operations 2010’ took stock of the need for a new strategy to support missions, following a five-fold 
increase in deployed field personnel since 2000. The strategy proposed a new ‘Capstone’ doctrine, 
new capabilities—in particular the Standing Police Capacity—and improvements to integrating UN 
work, including in SSR. Between 2009 and 2011, two reports (and associated debates, statements 
and resolutions from the Security Council and General Assembly) have driven this agenda, with SSR 
mentioned throughout: Peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict and the International 
Review of Civilian Capacities.32 A key finding of these reports is that assistance from internationals 
should be more firmly grounded in partnerships, including for SSR activities. These could be 
through national/international transition compacts, or other agreements and structures that frame 
international assistance within a national political dialogue and ongoing process of negotiating 
change.33
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Introducing SSR: the OECD, the UN, peacekeeping and 
political missions 
The OECD—SSR through a development lens
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) was instrumental in developing 
the concept of SSR in the mid-1990s. In 2001 the OECD highlighted the need to support security 
and justice sectors comprehensively, because they are ‘intimately linked’.34 In 2005 the OECD-
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) released comprehensive SSR guidelines. As a multilateral 
development organisation, the OECD approached SSR ‘squarely within a development cooperation 
lens’ and stated that the primary goal of SSR is to ‘create a secure environment conducive to 
development, poverty reduction and democracy’. However, the SSR guidelines noted that OECD-DAC 
efforts also sought ‘to improve policies and practices to prevent violent conflict and build peace’.35 
Between 2004 and 2006 debates about SSR peaked including across the development, peace and 
security pillars, questioning what SSR was, and was not. At the same time, an emerging SSR epistemic 
community of practice produced research, guidance and doctrine, new funding arrangements, new 
specialist units, standby capacities and rosters. In particular, the now 61-member international 
foundation, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) significantly 
contributed to the development of SSR.36 The World Bank was also rethinking public and military 
expenditure, transparency and governance, stating that ‘the military sector should be subject to 
the same general principles of public financial management as other parts of the public sector’.37
The development community recently refocused on development-security linkages, and the inability 
of conflict-affected states and donors to meet the standards set by the 2005 Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness. Much of that debate occurred after the publication of the World Bank World 
Development Report 2011,38 through the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding 
2009–2011, and with the creation of the g7+ grouping of conflict-affected states, with leadership 
from Timor-Leste. Following studies in seven of those countries, the reports concluded that national/
international partnerships supporting SSR had produced good practices (SSR was a priority in Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers, for example) but that the support was ‘inconsistent’. The international 
dialogue concluded with a ‘new deal’ that stressed the need for inclusive politics, and the need to 
establish and strengthen people’s security in fragile states.39 The more detailed OECD-DAC SSR 
handbook produced in 2010 noted also that, during implementation, donors were hampered by their 
lack of coherent SSR strategies, lack of suitable specialist capacities to help states embarking on 
reform, and lack of sufficient methods to evaluate the impact of programs.40
A 10-year review of OECD security and justice programming identified more specific lessons. This 
study revealed that external support for security and justice programming needs to be conceived in 
a way that stimulates and manages change in complex, politicised and fast-changing environments. 
As a result, programs need to be able to mobilise resources (funding, people, political capital) and 
find ways of working (flexible, building trust and long-term relationships) that are most effective 
11Security Sector Reform Trends: Conflict-Affected States and International Responses   ACMC
in these environments. The review concluded that there is now a good understanding of how to 
optimise reform and change, with country-specific examples to show how it can be done. However, 
the research also concluded that change in the security sector often happens as a result of chance or 
exceptional circumstances that are more to do with the right national and international personalities 
having sufficient political backing, and that best practices are not hardwired into the way these types 
of programs are established or modified.41
Convergence on SSR in the United Nations
SSR was debated first in the General Assembly’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations 
(the C34), with references at least from 2004.42 The Security Council possibly first addressed SSR 
in a 2005 thematic debate on ‘the role of the Security Council in Humanitarian crises’. The Council 
emphasised that ‘security sector reform is an essential element of any stabilisation process in post-
conflict environments’, and that the inextricable normative links to the rule of law, transitional justice, 
DDR and the protection of civilians. In the same year the ‘Peace Operations 2010’ strategy from 
the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations sought greater capacity for these tasks, including 
by developing the UN Standing Police Capacity. World leaders’ attention to international threats, 
culminating in the 2005 World Summit, shaped the broader normative debate. These debates 
resulted in consensus to improve conflict prevention, mediation and peacebuilding, and to develop 
the concepts of ‘protection of civilians’ and the ‘responsibility to protect’.43 
These precedents provided an enabling environment for Slovakia to take proactive and deliberate 
leadership on SSR in preparation for its month as President of the Security Council. Slovakia 
introduced SSR over six months in 2006–07 through three regional workshops, an Arria-formula 
meeting, and the Council’s first thematic SSR debate in February 2007.44 The United Kingdom was 
the most supportive of the permanent five members of the Security Council, having championed the 
concept in preceding years. Acceptance of SSR enabled the terminology to be used more broadly. 
For example, SSR is included in each Presidential Statement following debates on post-conflict 
peacebuilding and the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34) now dedicates 
a section of its annual report to SSR.45
At the request of the Security Council following the first SSR debate in 2007, the Secretary-General 
wrote a comprehensive report on SSR. The Council discussed the report in a second debate in 
2008 under the United Kingdom Presidency and there was a third debate in 2011 under the Nigerian 
Presidency. In January 2013, the Pakistan Presidency led a debate on multidimensional peacekeeping 
where, possibly for the first time, a thematic resolution mentioned SSR (this was the first resolution 
on peacekeeping in a decade). The text in that resolution, copied in part in Figure 3 (in Annex C), 
importantly also connected the protection of civilians with peacekeeping SSR mandates.46 The 
October 2011 Presidential Statement on SSR called on the Secretary-General to submit an assessment 
of UN support (a second report) by early 2013, and to recommend how to best strengthen the UN’s 
‘comprehensive approach’.47 A fourth debate was then expected to take place later in 2013. 
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The rapid growth of SSR and related mission mandates
In October 2004, before its first thematic mention of SSR, the Security Council had already provided 
an explicit and expansive SSR mandate to the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(MONUC). Although few mandates have been as ambitious since, the table at Annex B tailored for this 
research shows the 10 UN peacekeeping operations and special political missions with explicit SSR 
mandates. The table maps a range of other related mandates, including in six other missions where 
SSR activities are also mandated. It shows that SSR and SSR-related mandates are now as prolific as 
the related provisions in peace agreements outlined above.48 
The number of SSR mandates has increased in the last decade, as has their range of field mission 
configurations. As peacekeeping has become more multidimensional (higher numbers and more 
diverse mandates), new international peacekeeping partnerships have evolved, for example, with 
other international or hybrid stabilisation forces in Timor-Leste, Afghanistan and Darfur.49 
Growth in SSR supported by special political missions
Less well known is the fact that there has been a three-fold increase in field-based special political 
missions in the last 15 years, with an expanded number and range of mandated tasks. This trend 
is expected to continue with the drawdown and possible transition to special political mission 
configurations in several large peacekeeping operations, and ‘a tendency toward lighter UN footprints for 
new missions’.50 Special political missions include all four integrated peacebuilding missions in countries 
on the Security Council’s agenda that are also supported by the Peacebuilding Commission, as well as 
its regional political offices. In 2010 the Security Council mandated the West African regional political 
office (UNOWA) to support SSR in that region.51 Another novel mission was deployed in Nepal (UNMIN) 
with a mandate to monitor the ceasefire between the Royal Nepal Army and Maoist army. Through a 
joint committee, the mission monitored the management of arms (through cantonment, registration 
and verification) and armed personnel. It did this with an integrated team of serving (out of uniform) and 
retired military officers, and civilian monitors. However, the mission was not given an SSR mandate and 
departed while ‘the security sector [remained] at the heart of the peace process’s unresolved business’ 
of integrating Maoist combatants and bringing the Nepalese Army under democratic control.52 
With no equivalent funding and backstopping arrangements that deploy and sustain peacekeeping 
operations, there has been a 1,256 per cent increase in special political mission costs in the last 
decade. This is largely due to assistance missions in Iraq (UNAMI) and Afghanistan (UNAMA).53 SSR 
in the context of peacekeeping operations is backstopped by the political and security leverage that 
comes with each formed military and police unit (from their capital and their commanders in the 
field), as well as the national interest of each troop and police contributing nation (their contribution 
to debates in the Security Council, membership of Groups of Friends). These networks are absent 
in special political missions. Five of the 10 missions with explicit SSR mandates are special political 
missions. The most recent is the integrated office in Libya (UNSMIL), which has the seventh most 
mandated tasks of all missions across all categories. UNSMIL’s most recent resolution includes a 
strengthened SSR mandate for one of the largest integrated SSR divisions in any UN mission.54
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SSR terminology: security sector actors, activities 
and principles
SSR terminology
While there are varied SSR definitions, there are minimal differences between them. This paper 
merges several definitions to focus on the SSR goal: 
Security sector reform describes efforts to improve the security of a state and its citizens,  
through an effective, affordable, accountable and transparent security sector. 
Figure 3 (in Annex C) lists a select number of definitions. Beyond this language, generalisations on 
security sector actors, principles and activities are difficult in any context, but particularly in conflict-
affected settings, given their political volatility and diversity. 
Overall, the SSR concept evolved first as a description of what international actors and agencies do in 
support of national actors, and second as a description of what national actors are seeking to do and 
to reform after conflict.55 The OECD described a security system, and African civil society actors held 
that reform terminology was too soft when transformation was needed to reshape the behaviour of 
former combatants and their leaders.56 As with rule of law and other normative debates, discussion 
continues around the relationship between SSR and other areas such as DDR and justice sector 
reform. 
Security sector actors
Notwithstanding the ongoing discussions, the OECD’s table in Figure 2 is frequently used to 
understand possible security actors in different fragile or conflict-affected states, for example,  
in the Security Council Concept Paper preparing for the first Security Council debate on SSR.57 
With vast differences between countries, actors can differ depending on many historical, legal, 
political and cultural factors.58
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Core security actors Armed forces; police; gendarmeries; paramilitary forces; 
presidential guards, intelligence and security services (both 
military and civilian); coast guards; border guards; customs 
authorities; and reserve or local security units (civil defence 
forces, national guards, militias).
Security management and 
oversight bodies
The executive; national security advisory bodies; legislature and 
legislative select committees; ministries of defence, internal 
affairs, foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; 
financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget offices, 
financial audit and planning units); and civil society organisations 
(civilian review boards and public complaints commissions).
Justice and law enforcement 
institutions
The judiciary; justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation 
and prosecution services; human rights commissions and 
ombudsmen; and customary and traditional justice systems.
Non-statutory security forces Liberation armies; guerrilla armies; private bodyguard units; 
private security companies; and political party militias.
Figure 2: Security sector actors (OECD)59
SSR activities and principles
The OECD is a key source of guidance on SSR activities globally due to frequent negotiations on 
overseas development assistance (ODA) and non-ODA eligibility.60 The OECD list of SSR activities is 
provided as a reference in Figure 4 (in Annex C). Several expert interviewees emphasised the need 
to first and foremost see SSR as a set of governance activities, and one said that ‘SSR has lost its 
governance moorings’.
The principles included in Figure 5 (in Annex C) are published in the UN Secretary General’s SSR 
report. That report was a horizon scan of 10 years of international experience, and was submitted to 
and accepted by the Security Council and the General Assembly. Highlight points are: 
 > The primacy of sovereignty and the need for outsiders to be explicitly invited by state authorities 
and/or the Security Council (with a similar standard to that established for international electoral 
assistance) and to avoid imposing external models.
 > The need to promote and sustain an environment of meaningful and inclusive national leadership 
and ownership.61
 > The ‘striking contrast between the neat, and often normatively driven, formulations of SSR and the 
messy and contested realities on the ground’.62
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Using different language in the same space
Concepts related and linked to SSR
Some interviewees believe there has been and remains too much attention to language in the 
international domain. In their experience, instead of illuminating a narrative on whether or not 
security sector change has occurred in different conflict-affected countries (outcomes), discussions 
on language ‘conclude in dead ends’. Other interviewees view those discussions as ‘rational and 
sometimes necessary debates’ reflecting different outlooks between countries and regions, 
the politics of funding streams (ODA and non-ODA), and the character, orientation and political 
composition of different international and regional organisations.63 On one hand, interviewees 
noted that Australia had contributed to these debates and also provided substantial support to 
SSR in conflict-affected states for many years. On the other hand, interviewees also recognised 
that Australian organisations generally use different terminology. 
‘Civil-military’ concepts are also used, but generally not to describe relationships between national 
security sector and civilian actors. Instead they frame issues and cooperation between Australian and 
other international defence and civilian actors (not police), mostly with a focus on the use of armed 
force and humanitarian space.64 
A range of other thematic terms are used and understood in different ways. Some are broad umbrella 
terms that envelop concepts such as SSR, while others are related terms that intersect with SSR 
operationally. Umbrella terms mentioned during the interviews included: ‘rule of law’, ‘democratic 
governance’, ‘peacebuilding’, ‘statebuilding’ and ‘stabilisation.’ Specific terms with more operational 
meanings that intersect with SSR included: ‘public administration reform’, ‘ justice sector reform’, 
‘DDR’, ‘armed violence reduction’, ‘trafficking in small arms and light weapons’, ‘women, peace and 
security’, ‘transitional justice’ and ‘demining’. A glossary of some of these terms is in the AusAID 
guidance to staff working in fragile and conflict-affected states, with some additional explanations 
in the ACMC and the Australian Council for International Development (ACFID) publication Same 
Space—Different Mandates.65 One of the lessons in the ACMC publication Partnering for Peace was 
that SSR should be part of a comprehensive approach.66
SSR in Australian government discourse
At a country-specific level, some interviewees noted there could be negative perceptions of SSR 
terminology, for example in the Pacific. The following examples illustrate the use of SSR in Australian 
official discourse: 
 > A 2005 Minister for Defence press release mentioned the deployment of an army lieutenant colonel 
to the Middle East, noting he would join the international team (with United States, British and 
Canadian counterparts) working on security sector reform.67
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 > In 2008, ACFID called for the government to use the same SSR lens adopted by the OECD in order to 
rectify weaknesses in Australia’s security policy framework.68 
 > The 2009 Defence White Paper referred to Afghanistan’s ‘security sector’ when describing the need 
to build Afghan institutions and mentor the Afghan National Army.69 
 > In 2007, when Australia asked to participate in the Security Council’s first SSR debate, the 
Australian Ambassador emphasised two examples: the Papua New Guinea request to support 
its armed forces restructuring, and the Solomon Islands request to assist in law and order and 
executive policing.70 
 > The 2011 AusAID publication and the 2012 ACMC and ACFID publications mentioned in 5.1 above 
include references to and definitions of SSR (see Figure 3 in Annex C). The 2011 AusAID guidance 
for staff includes descriptions of the tensions between security and development approaches 
in settings such as Afghanistan, and explains how SSR can be one element of technical support 
for peace settlements, as well as in support of Australian troop or police deployments for 
peacekeeping and peace monitoring.71 
 > During the 2013 General Assembly Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, the Australian 
Ambassador spoke on behalf of Canada, Australia, New Zealand (the CANZ group), and linked 
professional and accountable security sectors with trust and confidence in judicial and security 
institutions. He also noted CANZ support to Defence Sector Reform.72
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Funding security sector reform 
International development actors are important to peace negotiations [because] agreements 
typically require international financing to be implemented (e.g. on security sector reform).73
Issues related to the politics of funding have manifestly affected how international actors support 
national SSR processes. Following an 18-month process, a 2005 OECD-DAC High Level Meeting 
endorsed directives ‘in particular explicitly to cover improved civilian control over the security 
system’, and in 2010, DAC Statistical Reporting Directives provided greater clarity on activities in 
the SSR and peacekeeping fields eligible to be reported as ODA and non-ODA.74 While the debates 
that led to these changes recognised the interdependence of security and development, there are 
significant tensions in these designations, including the risk of rebranding traditional security activities 
as development.75 It is often not simple to demarcate areas claimed to be ‘carefully delineated’76 
and excluded from eligible SSR ODA funding, in particular military aid, anti-terrorism activities and 
peacekeeping. Another concern is that where SSR activities are not ODA-eligible, and therefore 
not reported, it is more difficult to see the full volume of resources spent on those activities and to 
evaluate their effectiveness.77
Notwithstanding these challenges, funding mechanisms for SSR activities have grown, in part due 
to the enabling environment provided by the World Bank’s World Development Report 2011, the 2011 
International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding process, and negotiations on the follow-up 
framework for the Millennium Development Goals. Pooled funding in capitals (United States, United 
Kingdom) as well as global and country-specific multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs) have been vehicles for 
growth in SSR funding. Many MDTFs explicitly combine ODA and non-ODA eligible activities and provide 
for joint national and international decision-making processes. Some of the growth has also been 
an extension of the earlier increased use of trust funds to support DDR; a study of 36 DDR processes in 
1992–2005 across 29 countries identified that 62 per cent had been supported by World Bank or UNDP-
managed MDTFs, with a trend to more MDTFs.78 A 2011 United States study recommended integrating 
and implementing DDR and SSR in tandem, ‘ideally with a shared pool of discretionary funding’.79
One MDTF example is the UN Peacebuilding Fund, where Australia is the eighth largest donor and 
has deposited half of its 2015 commitment of US$20.8 million.80 For the Peacebuilding Fund, SSR is 
organised under implementing peace agreements, shown in Figure 6 in Annex D. Also in Annex D, 
Figure 7 shows the growth in funding of SSR activities over the last two years and Figure 8 shows the 
titles of each SSR project. Activities range from rehabilitating military barracks to supporting an Office 
of National Security. 
Peacebuilding Fund guidelines do not stipulate a breakdown of SSR into specific activities, so projects 
generally arise from joint national/international discussions at the country level. A 2012 review of 
Peacebuilding Fund projects identified that SSR projects had grown to constitute 19 per cent of total 
funding. For those SSR projects, 72 per cent of funding went to hardware (infrastructure, equipment), 
and only seven per cent to ‘security sector wide’ initiatives such as governance, oversight and 
management. The review recommended greater investment in national dialogue processes, conflict 
analysis to establish strategic relationships between security and justice sector reforms, and seeking 
more ‘grass roots’ or civil society engagement in reform activities.81 
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The SSR community and its civilian capacity
SSR is the hardest thing to do with the least amount of success. It is highly political, and 
therefore incredibly challenging for external actors to have a valuable contribution.82
A consistent message in SSR evaluations is that international support for SSR ‘must be flexible, 
adaptable and tailored to the host country concerned’.83 In addition to the OECD and UN system 
capacities that have grown since the formal endorsement of SSR in those organisations, other 
organisations have also systematically developed SSR policies and specialist capacities. Interviewees 
from many of these organisations stated there is a good degree of collaboration and partnership 
between them, and many Australians and internationals have advocated for a stronger Australian role 
in SSR debates and lessons learned. 
Australia’s 2009 Federal Audit of Police Capabilities outlined many international police capacities,84 
and the International Review of Civilian Capacities mapped broader SSR capacities in 2010–2011 (see 
Annex E). Examples of these capacities include:
 > In addition to its strong research agenda, DCAF has now developed an International Security Sector 
Advisory Team, supporting SSR in conflict-affected states. In the last six years DCAF and partners 
also initiated an Inter-Parliamentary Forum for Security Sector Governance in South-East Asia.85 
 > The civil society African Security Sector Network (ASSN) has been one of the most vocal 
proponents of African-led change across the continent’s security actors, and has supported the 
African Union develop an SSR policy framework. Fundasaun Mahein in Timor-Leste is a civil society 
actor, seeking ‘to assist in increasing the legitimacy and capacity of the Timorese security sector 
through citizen participation’.86
 > In 2009 the United States Department of State, Department of Defense and USAID promulgated 
joint guidance on SSR, with roles and responsibilities, terminology and guiding principles, and 
reference to bilateral donor approaches including by the UN, OECD, European Union and North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The objective was to bring attention to higher-level governance 
issues when most focus was on train and equip activities. The joint approach also allowed 
department and agency guidance to incorporate SSR language; for example, in United States 
military operational guidance for all geographic combatant commands. The policy also went some 
way to addressing significant whole-of-government challenges, but issues remain (see Annex F). 
After three years of work, a draft Presidential Policy Directive on Security Sector Assistance was 
signed in 2013, addressing whole-of-government planning, assessment and evaluation.87
As with the case in the United States, and despite the effort since 2005, international SSR experts 
point to a persistent SSR capacity gap: the lack of known qualified senior and expert individuals who 
can develop trust with and mentor (not substitute) nationals engaged in the ‘high politics’ of SSR. In 
addition to having knowledge of the reform of their own national system, the internationals add value 
by understanding a range of comparative cases that may have relevant lessons to draw on. Setting 
aside the many potential security sector actors, there is a lack of available civilians who can advise on 
defence and police reform and governance on the one hand, and the strengthening of Parliament and 
other oversight institutions on the other.
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Annex A: Frequency of provisions in peace agreements 1989–200688
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Annex B: Table of Security Council missions with SSR and related 
mandates89
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Annex C: SSR definitions, activities and principles 
Figure 3: Selection of SSR definitions
 > In 2001 the OECD described SSR as the ‘transformation of the security system’ and offered the 
following definition: ‘“Security sector reform” is the transformation of the “security system” 
which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, so that it is managed and 
operated in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of 
good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework.’ In 2005, OECD 
guidance noted, ‘There is room for debate on the breadth of the definition of SSR’.
 > In 2007, speaking at the Security Council’s first SSR debate, the Australian Permanent 
Representative to the UN highlighted the UN’s attention to ‘the way in which an appropriately 
structured, led and motivated security sector can contribute to peace and security’. The 
Presidential Statement that followed noted that security sectors need to be ‘effective’, 
‘professional’ and ‘accountable’. 
 > In 2008 the UN Secretary-General’s SSR report noted, ‘The overall goal of SSR is to support 
States and societies in developing effective, inclusive and accountable security institutions so as 
to contribute to international peace and security, sustainable development and the enjoyment of 
human rights by all’. 
 > In 2009 the United States government defined SSR as ‘the set of policies, plans, programs, and 
activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. 
The overall objective is to provide these services in a way that promotes an effective and legitimate 
public service that is transparent, accountable to civilian authority, and responsive to the needs of 
the public’. It then stated, ‘SSR is an umbrella term’ and listed examples of 10 integrated activities.
 > In 2011 AusAID’s guidance for staff working in fragile and conflict-affected states, Table 2: ‘Key 
elements of the political settlement’ noted SSR was one of five types of assistance to achieve 
‘monopoly on the legitimate use of force/develop shared agreement amongst elites on institutional 
mechanisms for using force’. 
 > In 2011 the World Bank’s World Development Report placed SSR in the category of work to 
transform institutions, to provide ‘citizen security’ through ‘foundational reforms and “best fit” 
approaches’. It provided four activities that should be approached using ‘phased capacity and 
accountability in specialised security institutions’.
 > In 2012 the ACMC and ACFID publication Same Space—Different Mandates noted SSR ‘is a 
multi-disciplinary, holistic and strategic approach to reform of the security institutions of a state 
including but not limited to armed forces and police, intelligence services, border and coast 
guards, oversight bodies such as the executive, legislature, ministries of defence, justice and law 
enforcement bodies, such as the judiciary, the prosecution and prison system and non-state or 
paramilitary security actors’.
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 > In 2013 in Resolution 2086 the Security Council noted multidimensional peacekeeping missions 
may: ‘Provide support to basic safety and security by assisting national security sector reform 
programmes, through strategic assistance to develop security sector frameworks, and capacity-
building of military, police and other law enforcement institutions in key areas, while upholding the 
spirit of complete national ownership and true partnership, with a view to building a legitimate, 
accountable and sustainable security sector, responsive to the needs of the population.’
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Figure 4: Categories of SSR activities (OECD)90
Political and Policy 
Dialogue and Initiatives
Activities aimed at improving civil-security force relations, increasing 
civilian input into security policy-making, and preparing the terrain for 
reform. This can include confidence-building activities between civilians 
and security force personnel. 
Armed Forces and 
Intelligence
Activities aimed at improving governance of the armed forces, the 
intelligence services, paramilitary forces and other reserve or local 
defence units that support military functions, provide border security 
and so on. 
Justice and Internal 
Security Apparatus
Activities involving police functions, prisons, courts, secret services, 
and civilian internal intelligence agencies. 
Non-state Security 
Forces
Activities involving private security companies and other irregular 
security bodies which enjoy a degree of public authority and legitimacy 
that is not derived from the state itself or legal status: political party 
militias/security forces, local militias, bodyguard units, and so on. 
Civil Oversight 
Mechanisms
Activities involving formal mechanisms – such as the legislature, 
legislative select committees, auditors general, police commissions, 
human rights commissions – and informal mechanism – such as civil 
society ‘watchdog’ organisations, and customary authorities. 
Civil Management 
Bodies
Activities aimed at strengthening functions for financial management, 
planning and execution; security policy development; personnel 
management and the like found in finance, defence, internal affairs and 
justice ministries, president/prime minister’s offices, national security 
advisory bodies and the like. 
Civilian Capacity 
Building
Activities aimed at general capacity building/education initiatives that 
do not fit into the civil management and oversight categories, including 
activities designed to build capacity of civil society groups seeking to 
analyse and influence security policy and increase public literacy on 
security issues, academic or other training courses on security issues. 
Regional Initiatives Activities involving the role of foreign affairs ministries/peacemaking 
initiatives, and formal mechanisms such as defence treaties/pacts, 
regional security bodies for dealing with defence, criminal, intelligence 
issues and the like. 
Initiatives to 
Demilitarise Society
Activities in the area of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
(DDR) of former combatants, with particular attention for child soldiers, 
small arms and light weapons and others.
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Figure 5: Basic principles to support a national SSR process (UN)91
Principle Explanation 
When to undertake SSR On the basis of a national decision, a Security Council mandate 
and/or a General Assembly resolution, the Charter of the United 
Nations and human rights laws and standards.
National ownership Support must be anchored on national ownership and the 
commitment of involved States and societies.
Flexible and tailored UN approach must be flexible and tailored to the country, region 
and/or specific environment in which reform is taking place, as 
well as to the different needs of all stakeholders.
Gender-sensitive Gender-sensitive throughout its planning, design, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation phases. It must also include the reform 
of recruitment processes and improvement in the delivery of 
security services to address and prevent sexual and gender-based 
violence.
Timely An SSR framework is essential in the planning and implementation 
of post-conflict activities. Ideally, SSR should begin at the outset 
of a peace process and should be incorporated into early recovery 
and development strategies.
Implementation requires a 
clear strategy
A clearly defined strategy, including the identification of priorities, 
indicative timelines and partnerships.
Motive, accountability and 
resources of internationals
Effective SSR is shaped by the integrity of motive, the level of 
accountability and the amount of resources provided.
Coordinated national and 
international efforts
Lead national entities and a designated international counterpart 
should be identified wherever possible.
Monitoring and evaluation Monitoring and regular evaluation against established principles 
and specific benchmarks are essential to track and maintain 
progress in security sector reform.
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Annex D: SSR funding over six years—the UN Peacebuilding Fund92
Figure 6: UN Peacebuilding Fund: Investments per priority area93
Figure 7: SSR projects by half year, total Peacebuilding Fund contribution 2007–2012
26 ACMC   Security Sector Reform Trends: Conflict-Affected States and International Responses
Figure 8: Peacebuilding Fund SSR project titles by funding facility94
Funded through the Immediate Response Facility
Chad Operational support to the Détachement Intégré de Sécurité (DIS)
Côte d’Ivoire Projet d’appui au developpement d’une strategie nationale pour la RSS en Cote 
d’Ivoire
Guinea Programme conjoint de prévention et réponse aux Violences Basées sur le 
Genre en Guinée
Guinea Urgent support project to special forces supporting the electoral process
Sierra Leone Support to the Government of Sierra Leone Police and the Armed Forces
Sierra Leone Support to the Sierra Leone Police Public Order Maintenance Capacity and 
Integrity
Somalia Quick Impact Police and Public Security Reform Project In the Puntland State 
of Somalia 
Funded through the Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility
Burundi Promoting discipline and improving relations between the National Defence 
Force and the population through morale building of the military corps
Burundi Rehabilitation of military barracks to lodge members of the National Defence 
Force (FDN) in order to reduce the presence of soldiers amongst civilians
Burundi Support to the Burundi National Police to operate as a local security force
CAR Construction of military barracks and brigades of the National Gendarmerie
Comoros Réforme du secteur de la sécurité en Union des Comores
Comoros Restructuration et renforcement des capacities operationelles de la Police 
Nationale
Congo D.R. Support for the selection, training and deployment of the Congolese National 
Police (PNC)
Côte d’Ivoire Appui à la restauration de l’ordre public et de l’autorité de l’Etat
Guinea Projet d’appui au processus de recensement biométrique des Forces de 
Défense et de Sécurité
Guinea Projet d’appui de la mise a la retraite de 4300 militaires
Guinea Projet de renforcement du contrôle démocratique et civil des Forces de 
Défense et de Sécurité (FDS) en Guinée
Guinea-Bissau Military SSR—Support to security and defence sector reform and socio-
economic reintegration
Guinea-Bissau Rehabilitation of Military Barracks
Guinea-Bissau Strengthening Internal Security and Criminal Justice Systems in Guinea-Bissau
Guinea-Bissau Support for the Preparatory Conferences for the Defense and Security Sectors 
within the National Conference process
Liberia Enhancing the Relationship Between the Police and Civilians in Communities
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Sierra Leone Emergency Support to the Security Sector
Sierra Leone Improved Public Order Management Capacity
Sierra Leone Rehabilitation of the Water and Sanitation facilities for the Republic of Sierra 
Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) barracks in Freetown
Sierra Leone Support to the Office of National Security
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Annex E: Sub-cluster capacity mapping—Security Sector Reform and 
governance95
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Annex F: The United States Center for Civil-Military Relations
The Center for Civil-Military Relations at the US Naval Post-Graduate School (NPS) in Monterey, 
California was established in 1994 to assist newly emerging democracies address civilian-
military challenges of the post-Cold War era. Over two decades it has evolved and now 
provides support to defense reform and institution building, improving peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding operations and civil-military responses to combating terrorism. Its primary 
focus is the global development of democratic defense management norms to improve the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of defense and security institutions. 
Its activities are sponsored by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, US 
Combatant and Component Commands, the Joint Staff, US Navy and US Army and the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense. It is able to leverage academic staff from NPS in designing its 
programs and its project teams may typically include multinational experts, academics, 
retired high-ranking military officers and civilian experts drawn from within and outside of 
government. 
It has five regional programs, each with tailored priorities: Africa, Asia-Pacific, Europe, Latin 
America, Middle East and Central Asia. Underscoring these are nine functional programs which 
cover all aspects of the relationship between elected civilians and security institutions (armed 
forces, police forces and intelligence agencies). These include the Civil-Military Education 
Program, the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program, the Global Peace Operations Initiative 
(to help countries develop contributions toward UN and regional peacekeeping capabilities), 
Defense Institution Building, the Defense Institution Reform Initiative, an International Defense 
Acquisition Resource Management program, Intelligence and Democracy, the Center for 
Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies (including peacebuilding and humanitarian aspects), 
the Multinational Exercise Program which delivers exercise planning, design and control, and 
an International Defense Transformation Program (looking at national security in the context of 
collective security arrangements). 
While the Center has a broad range of responsibilities and versatile funding streams it 
manages these with a small, but deeply experienced permanent staff and relies heavily on 
expert rosters and the academic resources of the NPS and beyond to deal with surge activities 
such as workshops, seminars and training courses, many of which involve foreign students. 
Additionally, the Center supports more than 20 countries abroad with different permutations 
of the above products where the point of departure in terms of political development (and 
conflict) is quite different; for example, Cambodia, Nepal, Tajikistan and Libya to name a few.
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Annex G: Abbreviations
ACFID Australian Council for International Development
ACMC Australian Civil-Military Centre
ADF Australian Defence Force
AFP Australian Federal Police
ASSN African Security Sector Network
AusAID Australian Agency for International Development
CANZ Canada, Australia and New Zealand Group, UN
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DCAF Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 
DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration 
DFAT Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UN
MDTF Multi-Donor Trust Fund
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECD-DAC OECD-Development Assistance Committee
PBF Peacebuilding Fund, UN
PKO Peacekeeping Operation, UN
SPM Special Political Mission, UN
SSR Security Sector Reform
USAID US Agency for International Development
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